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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyse the European system of Air Traffic Management (ATM) as a specific case 
study of risk regulation in the framework of the European integration process. At the present, the 
implementation of the Single European Sky is a growing area of EU policy, which shows the potential 
and the difficulties of coordinating national competences in a supranational regulatory framework. 
This search for coordination has a direct impact on air traffic safety itself and it involves the 
development of risk mitigation policies at both the EU level and at the level of individual Member 
States. 
The existing trade off between risk and safety as conveyed by technology affects both the instruments 
and the content of risk management. Since the failure of safety measures when providing air services 
could result in disaster, regulation needs to address this issue. Two main questions assist in the 
implementation of the regulatory framework: what level of protection is appropriate against such 
uncertainty and the risks of possible catastrophic impact, and who bears the risk in case the delivered 
safety system fails. Precautionary safety standards on the one hand and liability remedies on the other 
are therefore addressed as the key issues for the regulation and distribution of risks. By focusing on 
these issues, the fragmentation of the current legal framework in ATM illustrates the current legal 
difficulties in the integration of the European skies. 
Keywords 
Air Traffic Management, European integration, risk regulation, air traffic safety, supranational 
regulatory framework. 
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Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse the European system of Air Traffic Management (ATM) as a new frontier 
of catastrophic risk regulation in the framework of the European integration process1. By focusing on 
this specific case study, the main legal issues of disaster risk regulation can be addressed. Considering 
that ATM concerns all the procedural and organisational aspects of the control of aviation safety, the 
understanding of the current regulatory framework highlights the existing trade off between risk and 
safety as it is conveyed by technology. Basically the search for technological safety in providing air 
services whose failure could result in disaster, affects the two main questions of disaster regulation: 
what level of protection is appropriate against such uncertain risks of possible catastrophic impact and 
who would then be charged with liability in case the delivered safety system failed. 
In fact, by developing a common framework for ATM in Europe, the EU has improved its on-
going strategy against disaster risks, by setting the standards beyond which the legal order does not 
want a specific risk to be incurred2. From this point of view, standards provide protection against 
threats, in the attempt both to preserve safety and to reduce the harm arising from the materialisation 
of the risk. In this way it is possible to control the level of risk that is to be considered unacceptable for 
the legal order, without turning an uncertain danger into an absolute and unjustified priority (in terms 
of resources) for the whole of society. 
Since standardisation is based on the assumption that risk cannot be eliminated entirely, but 
can instead be rationally managed by fixing its acceptable levels, the definition of a rational and 
balanced relationship between risk and safety cannot function without providing the means to transfer 
the risk – whose materialisation cannot be prevented – to the parties who are in the best position to 
bear it. A regulatory system should therefore assess who bears the consequences, and to what extent, 
of a failure of the safety system in order to sustain technological progress and reduce risk. Liability 
remedies therefore play a significant role in the ex post management of risks by distributing risks 
among the relevant actors. This is particularly evident in a sector like ATM where a redistribution of 
tasks and responsibilities between automated systems and human operations3 would improve the 
performance of air navigation and the mobility of people and goods. For instance, technology can help 
to make aircrafts fly on the same course, by controlling automatically the risk of mid-air collision. 
This highly innovative technology, which can have a great impact on the day-to-day number of flights, 
however, has not yet been used in civil aviation, since the liability framework is not clear cut in this 
socio-technical system. 
By analysing the European case of ATM, this paper therefore aims to deepen legal research on 
standard-based risk regulation in disaster related contexts. Currently, even though the European Union 
is implementing a multilevel governance of catastrophic risks that is based on the standardisation of 
countermeasures, the European literature on the subject is still limited since it focuses basically on the 
application of the precautionary principle as a burden of proof on the party that would like to introduce 
a new risk, concerning its compatibility with the protection of health and the environment4. In the 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Giovanni Sartor and Martin Scheinin for their valuable comments and remarks. Usual disclaimers 
apply. 
2 In this regard see M. Simoncini, Regulating Catastrophic Risks by Standards, in EJRR, 1/2011, pp. 43 ff. 
3 In this regard see G. Contissa, Addressing Liability of Automated Systems in Air Traffic Management, EUI Working Papers 
MWP 2011/30, p. 1 ff. 
4 Among others, see G. Majone, What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications, in  Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 1/2002, pp. 89-109; N. de Sadleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal 
Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; E. Fisher - J. Jones - R. von Schomberg (eds.), Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle. Perspectives and Prospects, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006; E. Fisher, Opening Pandora's Box: 
Contextualising the Precautionary Principle in the European Union, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 2/2007, 
available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956952, pp. 1-43; A. Alemanno, The Shaping of the 
Precautionary Principle by European Courts: From Scientific Uncertainty to Legal Certainty, Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 1007404, 2007, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007404, pp. 1-13; 
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meantime, legal research on disasters still focuses on the function of civil protection and its capacity to 
provide a parallel system of intervention, which can act adequately as a surrogate for the ordinary 
administrative tasks and competences in a special and derogatory manner5. Furthermore, literature on 
standards only exists in a few and fundamental parts of more general studies on regulation6, whereas 
American research on these topics has been developed along with the core questions of administrative 
law since 19807. 
By developing previous studies on catastrophic risk regulation8, this paper focuses on the 
specific case of the ATM system in the European legal order, with the aim to address the main legal 
challenges related to the enhancement of safety in this sector. After having reconstructed the basics of 
EU regulation on ATM – meant as both the institutional foundation (§ 2.1) and the functioning (§ 2.2) 
– and the need to speed up its development in the light of the recent volcanic ash crisis (§ 2.3), I 
analyse the legal instruments to improve safety. I address precautionary safety standards and liability 
remedies as the key issues to tackle those risks of catastrophic impact related to the failure of the ATM 
system. On the one hand, the standardisation of safety is considered to be an attempt to rationally 
manage uncertain risks; safety performance standards in ATM (§ 3) are therefore framed in the 
European model of standard-based risk regulation of disaster risks (§ 4). On the other hand, liability is 
considered to be a means to transfer the risk of failure of this rational management of uncertainty (§ 
5). In this light, I analyse liability related to both the implementation of safety standards (§ 5.1 and § 
5.2) and to the standard setting (§ 5.3), aiming to show that the clarification of the liability framework 
can help enhance ATM performance. On the grounds of this analysis, in the final remarks I assess the 
European ATM system as an illustration of the reasons and the difficulties of the on-going integration 
between EU Member States. 
 
 
1. The ATM system in the European regulatory framework 
Air Traffic Management consists of both human and technological procedures and resources necessary 
to safely guide aircrafts both flying in the skies and operating on the ground. From an operational 
point of view, this fundamental function is divided into some distinct tasks aimed at maximising the 
utilisation of the available airspace, building efficient skyways (airspace management), providing a 
safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic so that its capacity is utilized to the maximum extent 
compatible with the safety of flights (air traffic flow and capacity management), checking that 
aircrafts are safely separated in every operational process (air traffic control) and correctly informed 
about their position (air navigation service provision). 
ATM is under the jurisdiction of states as airspace, and its management is a fundamental part 
of national sovereignty. In order to make international fights possible, international conventions aim to 
coordinate the national performances of this function. In this regard, the Convention on International 
(Contd.)                                                                  
J.Dutheil de la Rochere, Le principe de precaution, in J.B. Auby - J. Dutheil de la Rochère (eds.), Droit Administratif 
Européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, pp. 459-471. 
5 On civil protection in the EU see SIPRI, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, SIPRI; 
Stockholm, 2008; S. Wiharta, European Civil Protection Force: A step towards a more effective disaster and 
humanitarian response?, in European Security Review, 42/2008, pp. 1-4; C. Wendling, Explaining the Emergence of 
Different European Union Crisis and Emergency Management Structures, in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 2/2010, pp. 74-82. 
6 See R. Baldwin - M. Cave, Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999; A. La Spina - G. Majone, Lo Stato regolatore, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000; for the English experience, see E. Fisher, 
Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Administration, in Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1/2000, pp. 109-130; for more recent work see B. Hutter, In catastrophe’s shadow, in 
Risk&Regulation, 19/2010, p. 3; Id., Risk regulation and the anticipation of natural disasters, ibidem, pp. 6-7. 
7 S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982. 
8 M. Simoncini, La regolazione del rischio e il sistema degli standard. Elementi per una teoria dell'azione amministrativa 
attraverso i casi del terrorismo e dell'ambiente, Editoriale Scientifica, Naples, 2011. 
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Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, has established rules for the safe use of 
airspace and it has grounded the responsibility for ATM on the contracting states9. 
In Europe this traditional fragmentation has however turned out to be a clear hindrance, in 
terms of efficiency, to the increasing volume of air traffic10. The increasing traffic, related to the 
growing mobility of both people and goods, needs increased coordination, and a common approach to 
ATM could help the implementation of that same coordination to EU economy. 
The European integration process highlights the free movement of people and goods 
throughout Europe. In order to make the common single market actually work amongst Member 
States, all the fundamental freedoms of movement – laid down in the Treaties – should be 
implemented in every sector-specific field of service regulation, and in particular in the domain of air 
traffic. From this point of view, liberalisation of public utilities has played a key role in setting up and 
implementing a competitive European market. Since this liberalisation process has interested the areas 
of shared competence between European Union and Member States, EU intervention in national air 
laws has been fragmented and driven by the rule of shared competence11. Like in other sectors (ICT, 
energy, other forms of transport), at first the creation of a competitive market through liberalisation 
policies affected the delivery of services,12 only then did it interest the infrastructural network 
(basically the assignment of slots)13. 
Later on, EU regulation focused on the technical functioning of the (internal) air market in 
order to implement effective air transport as far as safety needs, future capacity and regularity of air 
services are concerned14. In this way, the search for a common European ATM framework aims to 
improve the efficiency of European flights and to make the movement of people and the exchange of 
goods more effective in the European Union. 
The very nature of the European integration process therefore requires air law to become also 
a supranational issue. To this end, the EU has developed regulation in air law through the 
establishment of the Single European Sky (SES), a common European regulatory area for air 
navigation services (ANS). This framework aims to improve the management of air space as a scant 
European resource by developing consistent regulation. However, since the ATM competence is still 
national, this European regulatory framework is still based on the functional cooperation of different 
national, supranational and international institutions. As a consequence, common rules are the 
outcome of a complex interaction between different levels of government. The following paragraphs 
are intended to illustrate the main profiles of the SES, by pointing out who the institutional parties 
involved in its setting and implementation are, and which fundamental novelties this new regulatory 
framework has introduced. In order to address the complexity of this integration project and its 
importance in the management of safety risks, its functioning is also analysed in the light of the recent 
volcanic ash crisis. 
 
 
1.1 The Single European Sky: the institutional framework 
In order to understand the nature of EU policies in ATM correctly, it is important to consider who the 
main actors engaged in the construction of this legal system are. A trilateral relationship takes place 
                                                     
9 See, in particular, art. 28 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944). In this regard see J. Huang, Aviation 
Safety through the Rule of Law. ICAO’s Mechanisms and Practices, Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands, 2009, p. 
34 ff. 
10 Eurocontrol assessed that with over 40,000 daily flights a day predicted for 2020, the current ATM system could cope with 
this volume of traffic in an efficient manner. 
11 See art.  80 (2) ECT. 
12 See in particular Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-
Community air routes; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services. 
13 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community 
airports 
14 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM (1999) 614 of 6 December 
1999, The creation of the Single European Sky; High Level Group, Single European Sky. Report, 2000. 
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between national, supranational, and international institutions which affects the current state of ATM 
integration and air traffic efficiency in Europe. Currently, the development of the European regulatory 
framework requires coordination between Member States, the EU and Eurocontrol in its capacity as 
the main international organisation responsible for air safety at the European transnational level 15. 
In the setting up of a European regulatory framework in ATM the distribution of functions between 
these relevant actors has been many-sided and by and large the EU plays a fundamental regulatory 
function, states cooperate with this regulation and its implementation, and Eurocontrol provides the 
necessary methodologies to assess technical safety issues. Basically the relations between the EU and 
states are based upon the competences provided in the Treaties and Eurocontrol has a key role in the 
improvement of EU efficient policies in this area. 
More precisely, the European Commission holds fundamental rule-making powers for the 
implementation of an efficient ATM regulation, playing a leading role in the examination and 
evaluation of air navigation performances by drawing upon the existing expertise of Eurocontrol. 
Besides, many agencies at EU level perform assisting tasks for the Commission. In particular, the 
Single Sky Committee16 ensures the appropriate consideration of the interests of all categories of users 
involved in the regulatory process and gives its opinion on many significant issues in the 
implementation of ATM network functions17, whereas the European Aviation Security Agency 
(EASA) is charged with technical tasks in the field of airworthiness and environmental certification18. 
The increasing commitment of EASA in developing these tasks19 should not overlap with the role of 
Eurocontrol, since they are meant to work in partnership in order to achieve an efficient regulatory 
system. Eurocontrol has helped the European Commission draft the regulatory framework and 
provides support to rule-making standards as well as safety and environmental legislations. 
At the national level the enforcement of EU regulation is carried out by National Supervisory 
Authorities, which are independent agencies entrusted with fundamental powers of control. Air 
navigation service providers (ANSP) are public or private entities authorised and designated by 
national supervisory authorities in the name of states in order to deliver air navigation services (ANS) 
on an exclusive basis20. 
The effective improvement of such a regulation needs the expertise of Eurocontrol, which 
cooperates closely with states and the EU with the aim to enhance safety in ATM and to ensure the 
effective management of air traffic. In this task Eurocontrol avails itself of a Performance Review 
Commission, which provides advice to the governing bodies on all aspects of ATM including policy 
                                                     
15 Eurocontrol (established by six original nations – Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands – and now made up of 39 participating states) was charged at first with the responsibility to provide upper air 
traffic management services for its member nations and to collect route changes from airlines. To this end, Eurocontrol 
established the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (UAC) in 1972, which was the first air traffic control centre to 
manage air traffic of more than one state (covering Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and northen Germany). As 
technological development made air traffic more global and more coordination was requested, it started expanding its 
tasks (see Protocol consolidating the Eurocontrol Convention, 1997) over further aspects of European flights in ATM by 
availing itself of a Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) which assists air traffic managers in ordinary as well 
emergency situations. 
16 Art. 5 of Regulationof the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 549/2004 of 10 March 2004. The Single Sky 
Committee is composed of two representative of each Member State and is chaired by a representative of the 
Commission. 
17 See art. 17 of Commission Regulation (EU) 677/2011 of 7 July 2011. For example, it gives its opinion on the designation 
of the Network Manager and of the chairperson and the voting members of the Network Management Board and on the 
Network Strategy Plan (especially, on the objectives of this plan at an early stage). 
18 See Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 216/2008 of 20 February 2008, repealing Council 
Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC, as amended by the Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 108/2009 of 5 February 2009. 
19 It is worth noting that EASA was established in 2002 (Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 
1592/2002 of 15 July 2002) with the specific aim to assist the EU Commission in the implementation and the control of 
safety measures and environmental protection. 
20 See artt. 7 and 8 of Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 550/2004 of 10 March 2004. 
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and planning, safety management at and around airports and in the Single European Sky airspace, as 
well as financial and economic aspects of services rendered21. This strong exchange of expertise has 
persuaded the EU to foster cooperation by integrating Eurocontrol within its legal framework. On this 
basis, the EU joined this international organisation22, in order to integrate it within its legal order, with 
the aim to benefit from its expertise in taking control of the entire European ATM; as a result, 
Eurocontrol recommendations can be mandatory in European Member States through their 
implementation by the EU. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the opinion of the Single Sky Committee, the EU 
Commission designated Eurocontrol as the European ATM Network Manager, that is an impartial and 
competent body who should perform fundamental regulatory tasks related to the optimisation of the 
use of European airspace23. This means that under the supervision of a Network Management Board 
(composed of representatives of regulators and regulated entities), Eurocontrol should monitor, report 
and forecast the performance of the European ATM network based on the agreed performance targets; 
act as a central unit for air traffic flow management across Europe; ensure the European airspace can 
accommodate the additional capacity needs, and seamlessly integrate airports into the network; give 
Member States and partners access to common resources; and support the deployment of technological 
improvements across the European ATM network. 
Finally, the EU and Eurocontrol boosted their cooperation by creating a new institutionalised 
partnership aimed at implement a common ATM system for Europe: the SESAR (Single European 
Sky ATM Research) Joint Undertaking24 aims to concentrate and coordinate all relevant research and 
development activities in Europe. 
 
 
1.2 The Single European Sky: the regulatory framework 
The first regulatory package developing a European policy in ATM was introduced in 2004. It pursued 
its goals to enhance the safety and efficiency of air transport in Europe; to reduce delays by improving 
the use of scarce airspace and airport resources; to improve air navigation services (ANS) and to 
decrease passengers costs by reducing the fragmentation of the air traffic management in Europe 
through the coordination of the decision-making process; in addition, it aims to improve the 
integration of military systems into the European air traffic management system. In this way, 
European air communications would become more efficient and competitive on the global market. 
By and large, this package provides common rules for the efficient management of the EU countries’ 
airspaces and it consists of four basic regulations, aimed at addressing the gaps in European ATM and 
reinforcing safety, by restructuring European airspaces and air navigation services25. This basic 
regulatory framework has been amended many times in order to tackle efficiency issues26 and the first 
                                                     
21 It was established by the Eurocontrol Commission in 1998, in accordance with the ECAC Institutional Strategy (1997). 
22 See decision of the Council No 2004/636/EC of 29 April 2004 on the conclusion by the European Community of the 
Protocol on the accession of the European Community to the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. 
23 See Commission decision of 7 July 2011, on the nomination of the Network Manager for the air traffic management 
(ATM) network functions of the Single European Sky, which is based on Art. 3 ff. of Commission Reg. (EU) No 
677/2011. 
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 219/2007 of 27 February 2007. 
25 See Framework regulation (EC No 549/2004) – laying down the framework for the creation of the Single European Sky; 
the Service provision regulation (EC No 550/2004) – on the provision of air navigation services (ANS) in the Single 
European Sky; the Airspace regulation (EC No 551/2004) – on the organisation and use of airspace in the Single 
European Sky; the interoperability regulation (EC No 552/2004) – on the interoperability of the European Air Traffic 
Management network. 
26 On air navigation services see Commission Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 of 20 December 2005, laying down common 
requirements for the provision of air navigation services; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006 of 6 December 
2006, laying down a common charging scheme for air navigation services, further amended by Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 1191/2010 of 16 December 2010; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1315/2007 of 8 November 2007, on safety 
oversight in air traffic management and amending Reg. (EC) No 2096/2005; Commission Regulation (EC) No 482/2008 
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report on the implementation of SES I was delivered in 200727, presenting the achievements and the 
new challenges for the construction of the Single European Sky. Based on the findings of this report, a 
second Single Sky legislative package (SES II), amending the former legislation, was adopted in 
200928, with the aim to face the growing demand for air transport by enhancing the capacity of 
infrastructure in traffic control29. Both safety needs and the coordination of ATM, together with the 
reduction of the environmental impact of air traffic, are the key issues of the new regulatory 
framework. In the pursuit of these safety goals, this regulation assigns specific tasks, to the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), while regular consultation with the relevant stakeholders (e.g., air 
navigation services providers, airport operators, airspace users, manufacturing industry and staff) is 
promoted in order to enhance both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the regulatory measures. 
The main achievement of this regulation is, however, the introduction of a new regulatory 
concept of airspace, which overcomes the traditional territorial recognition with an operational 
identification: regardless of national boundaries, Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) are established 
by defining operative regions (between European States) where air navigation services should be 
delivered with a view to the optimization of their performance, through either the cooperation among 
air navigation services providers or the establishment of an integrated provider30. This is the first 
regulatory initiative to create a unique European airspace by integrating neighbouring national 
airspaces into a bigger operational region and it shows the introduction of a new regulatory 
perspective, based on efficiency assessment and no longer on territorial jurisdiction. This does not 
means that states have lost their role; on the contrary they work closely on the implementation of 
FABs and they maintain responsibility for its correct functioning. Currently, National Supervisory 
Authorities should cooperate closely to ensure adequate supervisions of ANS providers and can 
delegate its functions only to qualified entities, whose characteristics are set out in the same 
regulation31. 
Moving from this operational perspective, another relevant goal of this second package is the 
improvement of performance in the key areas of safety, capacity, cost-efficiency and environmental 
(Contd.)                                                                  
of 30 May 2008, establishing a software safety assurance system to be implemented by air navigation service providers 
and amending Annex II to Reg. (EC) No 2096/2005; as the use of air space is concerned see Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2150/2005 of 23 December 2005, laying down common rules for the flexible use of airspace; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 730/2006 of 11 May 2006, on airspace classification and access of flights operated under visual 
flight rules above flight level 195; for the enhancing of interoperability see Commission Regulation (EC) No 1033/2006 
of 4 July 2006, laying down the requirements on procedures for flight plans in the pre-flight phase for the Single 
European Sky; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1032/2006 6 July 2006, laying down requirements for automatic 
systems for the exchange of flight data for the purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights between air 
traffic control units; Commission Regulation (EC) No 633/2007 of 7 June 2007, laying down requirements for the 
application of a flight message transfer protocol used for the purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights 
between air traffic control units; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1265/2007 of 26 October 2007, laying down 
requirements on air-ground voice channel spacing for the Single European Sky. 
27 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2007) 845 of 10 January 
2007, First Report on the implementation of the Single Sky Legislation: Achievements and the way forward. 
28 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 1070/2009 of 21 October 2009, amending Regulations 
(EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004 and (EC) No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance 
and sustainability of the European aviation system. 
29 See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2008) 389 of 25 June 2008, Single European Sky II: towards 
more sustainable and better performing aviation. 
30 Art. 2 of Reg. (EU) No 1070/2009, introducing art. 9a to the Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. Note that Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 176/2011 of 24 February 2011 laid down the information to be provided before the establishment and 
modification of a functional airspace block, with particular reference to safety, air traffic flows, consistency with the 
European route network, costs, transfer of responsibility for air traffic control, compatibility between the different 
airspace configurations, regional agreements and performance targets. 
31 Art. 2 of Reg. (EU) No 1070/2009. In addition, the states belonging to the same functional airspace block can designate a 
system coordinator, who shall facilitate the overcoming of difficulties in the negotiation process and who shall report to 
the EU Commission, Single Sky Committee and EU Parliament every three months. 
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impact. In particular, in March 2010 new common rules on air traffic flow management (ATFM) were 
introduced with the aim to optimise available capacity in the use of airspace and enhance ATFM 
process32. Furthermore, in July 2010 on the grounds of art. 11 of Reg. (EU) No 1070/2009, the 
performance schemes for air navigation services and network functions were established: by availing 
itself of a system of measurable standards and alert thresholds, the regulation identifies Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) and binding targets on the key areas of safety, environment, capacity 
and cost-efficiency33. Performance plans, containing incentives to achieve the safety, cost-efficiency, 
capacity and environmental targets, should be adopted either at national level or at the functional block 
airspace block level, by the competent National Supervisory Authorities, in accordance with the 
general performance targets provided by the EU after a consultation with stakeholders and EASA 
(European Union-wide performance targets)34. In this framework Eurocontrol has been designated as 
the Performance Review Body to assist the Commission with its technical competence in the 
implementation of the performance scheme, the EASA in the development of safety measures and the 
National Supervisory Authorities in their regulatory functions35. 
In the first implementation phase, the main regulatory effort has been concentrated on the 
enhancement of safety through the definition of standards aimed at securing technological integration 
and efficiency. With the aim to further develop safety KPIs the Commission established a Working 
Group consisting of representatives of EASA, Eurocontrol and the Commission itself, which produced 
a technical report on the metrics for an effective safety management. This report, as improved on the 
basis of the feedback received by stakeholders, constituted the “technical concept” of the 2011 
Commission implementing regulation on performance schemes36. 
 
 
1.3 Safety at risk: the volcanic ash crisis in the complexity of the Single European Sky 
In April 2010 the implementation of SES II was accelerated by the volcanic ash crisis, which 
demonstrated the urgent need for coordination in European ATM37, since the application of the ICAO 
international rules to the emergency situation at stake cost about 4.7 billion $ on the global GPD38. 
Since such a national approach to a transnational issue produced significant problems for airlines and 
their business as well as to the free movement of passengers and goods, the EU Commission proposed 
a coordinated approach to the case. 
                                                     
32 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 255/2010 of. 25 March 2010 laying down common rules on air traffic flow 
management; but see also Commission Regulation (EU) No 73/2010 of 26 January 2010 laying down requirements on 
the quality of aeronautical data and aeronautical information for the single European sky. 
33 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 of 29 July 2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation 
services and network and in particular Annex I on key performance indicators (KPI). 
34 Artt. 9-10 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. Note that the EU Commission is charged with the task of assessing the consistency 
of  performance plans with its EU-wide performance targets, monitoring the implementation of performance plans and 
periodically reviewing its wide targets and setting and supervising the functioning of the alert mechanism; see artt. 13-19. 
35 Commission decision on the designation of the Performance Review Body (PRB) of the Single European Sky C (2010) 
5134 final of 29 July 2010; on the tasks and responsibilities of the PRB see Art. 3 Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. This 
designation is for a fixed term consistent with the reference period and ends on 30 June 2015, but nothing is included 
about the possibility of renewing the designation. On the tasks and responsibilities of the PRB see Art. 3 Reg. (EU) No 
691/2010. 
36 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 of 24 November 2011, amending Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 691/2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions. 
37 Council of European Union, Extraordinary meeting. Transport, Bruxelles, 4 May 2010, on the EU response to the 
consequences of the volcanic ash cloud for air transport. In particular, the Council stressed the need to accelerate the 
implementation of the functional airspace blocks, the nomination without delay of the Functional Airspace Blocks 
coordinator, appointment of a European network manager before the end of 2010, the adoption of the performance 
scheme, the implementation of EASA's competences on ATM, the creation of a crisis coordination cell, and the adoption 
of the SESAR deployment strategy before the end of 2010. 
38 See Oxford Economics, The Economic Impact of Air Travel Restrictions Due to Volcanic Ash, available at 
http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/samples/volcanic%20update.pdf. 
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The spread of the Icelandic volcanic ash induced European States to enforce ICAO guidelines 
for these events39 and introduced emergency blocks of their airspaces, pursuing a precautionary 
approach, regardless of ash concentration and the economic impact of the ban on flights. In the general 
unrest against that measure, the EU Commission proposed and coordinated an intergovernmental 
extraordinary meeting of European Ministers of Transport, which provided a plan based on a technical 
assessment by Eurocontrol, aimed at regulating the possibility of flying according to the degree of ash 
contamination40. By mapping European airspaces by dividing it into three zones, a common European 
framework of emergency traffic management was established: in the first area (“located in the central 
nucleus of the emissions”, as the declaration of the EU Ministers of Transport put it) with the highest 
degree of ash concentration, the safety goal was achieved only by maintaining the ban on flights (“a 
full restriction of operations”); in the second area, where there were “still amounts of ash” (a grey 
zone), the possibility of pursuing air traffic operations should be decided “in a coordinated manner” by 
Member States; the third zone, being “not affected by the ash”, was subject to no restriction. 
In this way, the search for a transnational response to this crisis meant a substantial relocation 
of the safety function in an emergency situation from states to the EU (even if following an 
intergovernmental pattern) and moved forward the implementation of Single European Sky. Basically, 
this emergency contributed to the improvement of disaster management by boosting both the 
organisation and the functioning of ATM. Looking at the organisational framework, the emergency 
stimulated the establishment of a Network Crisis Management aimed at directing the response to 
network crisis. Under the coordination of the Network Manager (Eurocontrol), supported by a new 
body, the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)41, this new body develops mitigating 
measures at network level and helps Member States develop contingency plans. 
From an operational standpoint, the volcanic ash crisis accelerated the introduction of ATM, 
implementing regulations concerning the traffic management’s performance in terms of safety, cost-
efficiency, capacity and environmental impact. By promoting the integration process in air traffic 
without delay, this case highlights the complexity of the development of ATM regulation from both 
functional and institutional perspectives. The definition of safety standards enforced over the entire 
EU seems to be the key instrument to develop a common policy without compromising the 
distribution of current competences in the EU42. This means that the involved safety risk is tackled 
through a rational system of protection. This rationality is therefore achieved through a cooperative 
process of national, supranational and international European institutions. 
 
 
2. ATM and the standardisation of safety 
Performance standards should be set upon the basis of the KPIs and the EU-wide safety performance 
targets, through the cooperative process which involves all the relevant actors of the European 
regulatory framework. 
Basically, the EU should provide wide safety performance targets and on these grounds 
Member States should lay down specific performance schemes in the elaboration of either national or 
FAB performance plans. For the first reference period for the implementation of SES II (2012-201443), 
however, no wide safety performance targets are going to be delivered at the EU level and Member 
States may set targets corresponding to the safety KPIs provided in the Reg. (EU) No 1216/2011. This 
regulation aims to improve the safety performance scheme by developing an ATM risk management 
                                                     
39 See section 3.4, ICAO Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds, 2007. 
40 Extraordinary meeting of EU Ministers of Transport, 19 April 2010. 
41 See artt. 18-19 of Reg. (EU) No 677/2011. 
42 In this regard, see A. Fioritto - M. Simoncini, If and when: towards standard-based regulation in the reduction of 
catastrophic risks, in A. Alemanno (ed.), Governing Disasters. The Challenge of Emergency Risk Regulation, Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 120 ff. 
43 Art. 7 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
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system based on the continuous measuring, monitoring, and reporting of three main indicators (safety 
KPIs): the management objectives, the risk severity and the safety culture. 
More specifically, the first safety KPI assesses the effectiveness of safety management by 
measuring it with a methodology based on the ATM Safety Maturity Survey Framework (SMS 
standard). This standard has been developed by Eurocontrol as an instrument aimed at improving a 
positive and proactive safety culture. Adjusting this means to the mandatory requirements of the 
performance scheme, EU regulation makes that methodology the basis of its management objectives: 
safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, safety promotion, and safety 
culture44. 
By availing of the Risk Analysis Tool methodology, the second safety KPI assesses the 
severity of three main categories of occurrences: namely the separation minima infringements (which 
concern the minimum distance between aircrafts required to reduce the risk of collision, as well as to 
prevent accidents due to wake turbulence); the runway incursions (which regards the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing 
and take off of aircraft); and the ATM-specific occurrences at all Air Traffic Control Centres and at 
airports. Covering all the operations (at airports, during departure and landing procedures and in 
flight), this assessment provides a scale of increasing gravity of possible accidents, from “no safety 
effect” to “serious incident”, moving across the classifications of “significant incident” and “major 
incident” and also taking into account the possible case of “not determined” accident due to 
insufficient information or evidence available45. 
The third safety KPI refers to the objective of just culture: through questionnaires prepared by 
EASA in consultation with Eurocontrol in its capacity of Performance Review Body, the level of 
safety culture is assessed46. 
It is worth noting that it is Eurocontrol the institution that should provide the methodologies 
necessary for the development of these three safety KPIs, through information delivered to the EASA, 
which then has to pass on the acceptable means of compliance and the guidance materials for their 
implementation before the start of the first reference period47. Furthermore, in its capacity of Network 
Manager, Eurocontrol has been entrusted with the supervision of network plans aimed at achieving the 
performance targets in the long term48. This means that from a technical point of view, the 
implementation of the SES is based on Eurocontrol’s safety expertise and this institution plays a key 
role in the management and the development of a European ATM system. 
National Supervisory Authorities elaborate the performance plans, the performance oversight 
and the monitoring of both plans and targets for the relevant airspace by availing themselves of the 
assessment criteria set out in Annex III of the Reg. (EU) No 691/201049. These provisions lay down 
that safety standards cannot be lower than the EU-wide targets, and only within this limit is it up to the 
involved Member States to define the adequate safety level. 
Beyond the performance targets, the performance plans shall also contain the traffic forecasts, 
the determined costs for air navigation services and a description of investment necessary to achieve 
the performance targets50. Based on this, the performance plans identify the different entities that are 
accountable to meeting the targets and their specific contribution, and include incentive mechanisms 
and measures to be applied to the various accountable entities to encourage the achievement of the 
                                                     
44 Annex 1, Sec. 2, point 1 a), of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010 as amended by Reg. (EU) No 1216/2011. 
45 Annex 1, Sec. 2, point 1 b), of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010 as amended by Reg. (EU) No 1216/2011. 
46 Annex 1, Sec. 2, point 1 c), of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010 as amended by Reg. (EU) No 1216/2011. 
47 Annex 1, Sec. 2, point 1 e) and f), of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010 as amended by Reg. (EU) No 1216/2011. 
48 More precisely, according to the artt. 4-6 of Reg. (EU) No 677/2011, network plans divide into network strategy plan 
which operates in the long term as an instrument to implement performance schemes and more specific network 
operation plans which develop the strategy plan in the short and medium terms along with the EU wide performance 
targets. 
49 Annex 3, points 1 and 2, of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
50 See Art. 10 and Annex 2 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
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targets. The incentives on safety targets, in particular, cannot be financial in nature and should consist 
in action plans, provided on a non-discriminatory and transparent basis and in an effective and 
proportional way as part of the regulatory environment51. These incentives should, in particular, drive 
the behaviour of the stakeholders subject to the target setting, and primarily the aviation industry. This 
means that the performance plans will assess the basic safety content of the ATM instruments. The 
accuracy level of action plans, however, can leave out some margin of discretion and in principle 
cannot exclude the possibility of allocating liability to the stakeholders. 
Finally, plans should provide a description of the measures to be taken by the National 
Authority to monitor the achievement of the performance targets, by implementing the safety 
programmes and the business plans even in the case that standards are not met during the reference 
period52. The performance plans should also be communicated to the EU Commission, which assesses 
their consistency with the EU-wide targets and recommends revisions where needed53. 
The EU-wide targets can be revised only on the evidence that they cannot achieve the safety 
goals, both before the beginning of the reference period if the initial data, assumptions and rationales 
of their setting are demonstrated to be no longer valid, and during the reference period as a result of 
the application of alert mechanisms54. These mechanisms aim to prevent the occurrence of a disaster 
and adjust the safety goals to the new data. The alarm system is based on a threshold model which 
rationally sets critical levels of safety beyond which urgent and appropriate actions are required 
(within three months), in order to restore adequate safety to ATM55. 
This regulatory model is actually based on the continuous monitoring of the safety 
performances and the tacit reliability of the risk monitoring systems, so that continuous watching can 
detect occurrences and can contain uncertainty. Gaps in the scientific assessments are, however, to be 
considered, especially in cases where a non-linear relationship between causes and effects – which is 
typical of complex systems – can affect the understanding of phenomena and can thus influence the 
appropriateness of the response. The nature of the risk at stake is catastrophic and the potential of 
accidents as a result of ATM failure should therefore take into account the uncertainty of risk 
assessment (identifying the probabilities of disaster risks is considered the greatest difficulty). 
 
 
3. The model of standard-based risk regulation 
EU policy in ATM can be framed in its more general strategy against disaster risks. These risks are a 
sensitive challenge for legal orders, since they are related to a high level of uncertainty and to elevated 
consequences in terms of casualties and losses when they occur. On the one hand, the elevated 
consequences call for some level of regulation; on the other hand, the uncertainty of their occurrence 
makes it difficult to review the evidentiary scientific justification, the assessment of costs and benefits 
and the means by which the goals are going to be pursued through administrative law standards 
familiar from the regulation of other, non-catastrophic risks. The low probability of catastrophic risk 
suggests not reacting to those risks, because in the face of the potential costs of the risk and its 
regulation, the benefits of protection are only just possible (since precautions may be made ineffective 
due to the unpredictable appearance of catastrophes56) and rarely achievable (because of the low 
probability of the risk). However, it is absolutely clear that the severity of the consequences of 
catastrophic events cannot be ignored by states and the international community, not only in the short 
run, in their role of political actors charged with the issue of guaranteeing collective security, but also 
in the long run, as institutions responsible for the respect of an inter-generational pact aimed at 
                                                     
51 Art. 11 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
52 Art. 17 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
53 Art. 13 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
54 Art. 16 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
55 Art. 18 of Reg. (EU) No 691/2010. 
56 On the notion of catastrophic risks as “virgin risks” see C. Kousky - J. Pratt - R.J. Zeckhauser, Virgin Versus Experienced 
Risks, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/kousky-pratt-rjz-revised.pdf. 
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assuring a sustainable development and use of scant resources. This applies with even greater force to 
multilevel legal orders such as the EU where different regulatory philosophies may clash and the 
consequences of catastrophes may be distributed unequally throughout the territory. 
The search for a suitable response to both the uncertainty of these risks and the current 
distribution of competences between the EU and its Member States has persuaded EU institutions to 
set standards of protection against catastrophic risks, aimed at outlining an acceptable management of 
their possible occurrence. This involves building disaster regulation on the notion of “significant” risk, 
that is the threat due to be regulated according to the assessment of the toll of victims and the damage 
accepted in a determined time and in a settled space57. This means that faced by the impossibility of 
eliminating disaster risks, regulation should engage in the reduction of their possible impact to the 
extent to which the costs do not exceed the benefits. By providing a due level of protection only 
against those threats whose actuality could produce intolerable effects for the relevant community, the 
call for caution is driven by the balancing of the different interests at stake and the consequences of 
every regulatory decision. Therefore, in a case by case analysis, risk regulation should consider the 
severity of the threat for human health, the degree of reversibility of its effects, the possibility of 
delayed consequences and the perception of the threat based on available scientific data58. As a result, 
the concept of tolerable risk does not fit with a mere mathematical or statistical analysis of its 
probability, but it is a regulatory concept that concerns the effectiveness of the regulation. 
In line with this reasoning, the EU Commission has been working on mitigating the impact of 
these uncertain risks through the setting of standards aimed at controlling the whole disaster 
management cycle, by improving the organisation and procedure of both risk regulation and 
emergency planning. In this way the prevention of catastrophes should be pursued by integrating 
emergency intervention and risk management, namely by implementing their coordinated activity in 
the multilevel legal system. 
In order to achieve this goal, the EU legal order is shifting from a functionalist approach to a 
more comprehensive approach to disaster risks. In particular, from sector specific initiatives – like the 
so-called Seveso directives concerning the prevention of major accident hazards in some chemical 
industrial plants59 – the regulatory framework has been developing a thematic approach to 
catastrophes and it aims to manage the whole disaster cycle (from risk assessment to emergency 
management). 
This thematic approach has been implemented in key legislation about floods, which tackles 
their catastrophic impact by using standard-based methodologies60. This directive identifies significant 
flood risks through a process of mapping, building flood risk management plans on maps of hazard 
and risk, according to statistics and previous experiences. At present this model provides the most 
workable instruments for protection, whose rationale can also be employed to tackle other disaster-
related issues. It is not by chance indeed that these methodologies were implemented in the 
management of the volcanic ash crisis, which was tackled by a coordinated use of mapping and ash 
concentration thresholds. 
                                                     
57 On the notion of significant risk see, in particular, C.L. Comar, Risk: A Pragmatic De Minimis Approach, in Science, 
4378/1979, p. 309; P.F. Ricci - L.S. Molton, Risk and Benefit in Environmental Law, in Science, 4525/1981, pp. 1096-
1097; S. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle. Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, pp. 11-19; G. 
Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 133-135; A. Alemanno, The 
Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 18/2008, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325770, pp. 33-36. 
58 In this regard, see C.R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, in Cornell Law Review, 4/2005-2006, pp. 893-894. 
59 See Directive of the Council No 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major accident hazards of certain industrial activities 
(Seveso I Directive); Directive of the Council No 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances (Seveso II Directive); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council No 
2003/105/EC of 16 December 2003 amending Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances (Seveso III Directive). 
60 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council No 2007/60/EC of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and 
management of flood risks. 
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By implementing this approach, the EU aims to go beyond it and manage all the different 
catastrophic risks within a common strategic framework. This means developing clear methodologies 
of risk standardisation which can rationalise the management of these low probability, high impact 
risks. In order to achieve this goal, first of all this strategy strengthens both the existing EU legislation, 
policies and programmes and the research and development on disaster risks61. Along with these two 
objectives, in the long term the EU Commission is thinking about the introduction of a framework 
directive for natural disaster prevention, as a further pillar of disaster management that would integrate 
preventive action and civil protection with the aim to prioritise hazards, map risks and manage 
emergency plans62. 
ATM safety standards can easily be framed in this general disaster adverse strategy, since they 
aim at setting safety thresholds which should be respected and implemented in the entire European 
Union. This way, the risk of aircraft collision is rationally addressed, by aiming at an acceptable trade 
off between the growth of air traffic and safety needs. From this point of view, since technological 
progress can significantly enhance the level of safety and the control of risks, it plays a key role in the 
implementation of aviation safety and, as a consequence, it makes standards more and more reliant on 
technology. This interaction between standard-setting and technology is at the heart of risk regulation 
and it sets the acceptable trade off between risk and safety. 
Since this model is based on rational risk reduction, it is clear that it cannot ensure the 
effectiveness of its solutions. On the contrary, technology can fail, determining the consequent 
inefficiency of standards with (possible) catastrophic effects. Standards as well can fail in assessing 
the risk correctly, misunderstanding the reliability of technology. Precautionary risk management 
cannot therefore be the only means of protection and further remedies should be provided to offer 
protection in the aftermath of a disaster’s occurrence. This means that risks that cannot be prevented 
should be transferred onto those parties who are in the best position to spread them. The allocation of 
liability thus represents a key legal remedy to ensure both tort reparation and a fair and efficient 
distribution of burdens in a legal order63. In this particular case, it works basically as a means of risk 
allocation and an incentive to the correct functioning of the preventive measures64. However, 
European regulation of ATM does not address this fundamental regulatory issue in an extensive 
manner and it prefers to rely upon a fragmented liability framework, made by both national rules and 
international conventions. 
 
 
4. Liability profiles in the Single European Sky 
In the Single European Sky safety needs are addressed through the implementation of a system of 
safety standards which aims to provide a common level of protection throughout the European ATM. 
The complexity of this legal framework makes it very difficult to allocate liability in case the system 
of standards fails to address safety issues and an accident happens. The level of involvement of the 
                                                     
61 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2009) 82 of 23 February 2009, A Community approach on the 
prevention of natural and man-made disasters. By setting disaster prevention in the short term, this communication 
implements EU strategy against disasters by focusing on the development of knowledge based disaster prevention 
policies at all levels of government – basically, through the creation of an inventory of information on disasters (§ 3.1.1.), 
the circulation of best practices (§ 3.1.2), the development of guidelines on hazard and risk mapping (§ 3.1.3) and the 
promotion of research (§ 3.1.4) – the coordination among the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster 
management cycle (§ 3.2) and the effective improvement of the already existing policy instruments (§ 3.3). 
62 European Commission DG Environment, Assessing the Potential for a Comprehensive Community Strategy for the 
prevention of Natural and Manmade Disasters, Final Report, 2008, pp. 18-19 and 85-90. 
63 See S. Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Regulation and the Law of Torts, in J.R. Hunziker - T.O. Jones (eds.), Product 
Liability and Innovation. Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment, National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 
1994, p. 153 ff.; G. Brüggemeier, Common Principles of Tort Law. A Pre-Statement of Law, BIICL, London, 2004, pp. 3 
and 22. 
64 In this regard see G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis, Yale University Press, New York, 
1970. 
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different institutions endorsed with technical tasks, regulatory functions and monitoring 
responsibilities is so intricate, that the clear identification of who is liable in a specific case could 
become a very tricky issue. In fact, standardisation can rationalise the search for safety in a risk 
context such as the ATM, but it may excessively simplify the analysis of the situation at stake through 
indicators and inferences based on technical data and scientific information. Furthermore, this rational 
standardisation can lawfully produce damage to those parties who experienced the failure of safety 
standards. In order to understand who is charged with liability in case of failure of the safety measures, 
not only should the implementation of safety standards be analysed, but the rule-making process 
should also be addressed. As described, the parties basically involved in ATM are public authorities 
belonging to different levels of government, operators and the aviation industry, and their lawful 
interaction in standard setting can produce possible damage of a catastrophic impact. 
The ground upon which this regulatory process is developed and the liability that should 
therefore be framed is indeed catastrophic risk regulation: this means that the probability of the 
occurrence of safety related risks with a disastrous impact are uncertain and that the impact of this 
occurrence overcomes the foreseeable damage caused by the collapse of single safety measures, since 
risks resulting from the complexity of ATM system cannot be captured by summing up the risk that its 
parts collapse separately. In addition, if every actor involved in the safety regulation plays its role 
correctly, the prevention of accidents is not assured, because of the complexity of the system in 
question. Establishing the liability framework therefore means allocating risk between different 
parties, in order to share the possible gaps in the search for safety and make a risk system like ATM 
work. 
Liability plays a fundamental regulatory function by influencing individual conduct and it can 
work as an incentive against unsafe behaviour. Law and economics’ literature has thoroughly 
investigated the deterrent function of liability as a remedy of private law, which can contribute to the 
achievement of public policy goals and which is actually complementary to ex ante public 
regulation65. Accident avoidance is pursued with a remedial system which aims to discourage unsafe 
conduct by allocating the legal and economic consequences of the damage onto who caused it. In this 
way, precautionary conducts are indirectly stimulated by the remedial system and safety is promoted 
with a backward approach. How liability is allocated therefore is a fundamental issue that the 
regulatory framework should address in order to achieve safety goals to the best level. Since liability 
rules can significantly contribute to reduce harm by imputing their costs on the relevant parties, an 
unbalanced liability mechanism is able to increase social costs and produce more harm. The choice of 
who might be liable and for what therefore assumes a key role in the avoidance of accidents and as a 
consequence it affects the correct functioning of the risk system66. 
A fundamental weakness of the European ATM safety regulation thus lies in the absence of 
common provisions on liability rules. In this way, not only is the efficient allocation of safety-related 
risks not coordinated in the European regulatory framework, but this legal fragmentation also affects 
the potential in the development of technological research on safety, making liability a remarkable 
issue in the enhancement of aviation safety. The following paragraphs examine these issues by 
focusing on the delivery of air traffic services as the implementation phase of safety policies and on 
the standard setting as the rule-making phase. 
 
                                                     
65 R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in Journal of Law & Economics, 1960, pp. 1 ff.; G. Calabresi, The Costs of 
Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis, Yale University Press, New York, 1970; S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of 
Accident Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987, p. 5 ff.; S. Shavell, Liability for Harm versus 
Regulation of Safety, in D.A. Wittman (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Law. Selected Readings, Blackwell, Mass., 2003, 
p. 59 ff.; J.P. Brown, Economic Theory of Liability Rules, in D.A. Wittman (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Law. Selected 
Readings, cit., p. 34 ff.; S. Shavell, Foundation of Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2004, p. 177 ff.; A.M. Polinsky - S. Shavell, Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam, 2007, 
p. 142 ff. 
66 On the different consequences of different liability systems see G. Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product 
Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, in Iowa Law Review, 1983-1984, p. 
834 ff. 
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4.1 Liability for delivering service provision: the subjective requirements of providers 
Air navigation service providers need a certification issued by the competent National Supervisory 
Authority, which attests that they satisfy all technical and operational requirements67. This 
administrative measure aims to preserve the public interest in the safe performance of ATM by first 
checking the subjective characteristics of the possible providers. Certificates therefore specify the 
rights and obligations of service providers with particular regard to safety68, with the aim to assign 
ATM tasks only to well-established entities, which can ensure – among the other requirements – safety 
beforehand, and both liability and insurance cover in the aftermath of any accident. 
Since these requirements are common to Member States, the validity of these certificates is 
mutually recognised all over Europe, so that within the necessary limits of the safety requirements the 
free movement of these particular services can be guaranteed in the EU69. In order to pursue this goal, 
National Supervisory Authorities need to monitor the providers’ consistent compliance with the 
requirements and the conditions fixed in the certificates, and to take the appropriate measures 
(including the revocation of certificates) in cases where compliance is no longer satisfied and safety is 
compromised70. In this way the administration has the final word on the adequate level of safety that 
should be assured in air navigation services. 
The effective achievement of free movement of services within the EU through the mutual 
recognition system, however, asks for the harmonisation of this certifying function. From this point of 
view, the implementation of safety standards can play a fundamental role in the identification of the 
appropriate level of safety that should be ensured: if prospective providers demonstrate they have the 
means and resources to achieve these standards, they can aim at being designated as ANSPs.  
It must also be pointed out that the charges that airspace users refund to service providers for 
the service related costs, “shall encourage the safe, efficient, effective and sustainable provision of air 
navigation services with a view to achieving a high level of safety and cost-efficiency and meeting the 
performance targets71”. This means that by financing the costs of service, operators indirectly 
cooperate in the achievement of the safety goals and they could therefore complain if this service is 
not provided correctly. 
Furthermore, the guarantees of liability and insurance cover that service providers can offer 
should be (at least) equivalent all over Europe, so that the compensation of possible damage does not 
become a legal barrier to the circulation of services. This obligation on air navigation services reflects 
the liability rules laid down in the directive on services in the internal market, according to which the 
                                                     
67 See recital 2 and art. 7 of Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. These certificates can be issued individually for each type of air 
navigation service (namely, communication, navigation and surveillance services, meteorological services for air 
navigation, and aeronautical information services) or for a bundle of such services. 
68 See art. 7 (2) and Annex II of Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. Certificates, assessing the applicant's conformity with the requested 
requirements, specify the period of validity (considered that they are reviewed on a regular basis) and according to Annex 
II (2), these can also provide further conditions related to “(a) non-discriminatory access to services for airspace users 
and the required level of performance of such services, including safety and interoperability levels; (b) the operational 
specifications for the particular services; (c) the time by which the services should be provided; (d) the various operating 
equipment to be used within the particular services; (e) ring-fencing or restriction of operations of services other than 
those related to the provision of air navigation services; (f) contracts, agreements or other arrangements between the 
service provider and a third party and which concern the service(s); (g) provision of information reasonably required for 
the verification of compliance of the services with the common requirements, including plans, financial and operational 
data, and major changes in the type and/or scope of air navigation services provided; (h) any other legal conditions which 
are not specific to air navigation services, such as conditions relating to the suspension or revocation of the certificate”. 
69 See recital 12 and art. 7 (8) of Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. 
70 Art. 7 (7) of Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. 
71 Art. 15 (3 f) of Reg. (EC) No 550/2004. 
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authorised service providers are required to be covered by appropriate professional liability insurance 
on the basis of the nature and extent of the risk they run by supplying specific services 72. 
Introduced with the aim to standardise the supply of services in EU, this obligation leaves 
substantially unchanged both EU and national liability regimes, since it pursues harmonisation through 
means of private law. While this insurance model can protect service providers against the possible 
losses due to their conduct and it can therefore promote the movement of services, it is, however, very 
difficult to cover those risks of a catastrophic nature which stem from the very failure of safety 
standards73. In this case, in principle liability cannot be blamed on the air service provider, since it has 
carefully complied with safety regulations and damage is the result of the chosen acceptable level of 
protection. At the same time, the resort of obligatory insurance instruments to cover the catastrophic 
nature of the risk that safety standards aim at mitigating is not economic (and therefore effortlessly 
feasible), since damages exceed the means of a single insurance company. Only insurance pools can 
therefore insure against catastrophes and contribute to make this provision effective74, but this 
presupposes the legal and economic assessment of uncertainty and its hypothetical consequences. This 
reasoning therefore requires further reflection, both legal and economic, on the traditional functioning 
of insurance systems. 
The actual implementation of safety into the Single European Sky asks for the introduction of 
more specific means addressing the liability issue from a public law perspective. This means designing 
common rules to share disaster risks among all the relevant parties, since on the one hand it can be 
assumed that their occurrence is a failure in standard setting, and on the other hand the involved costs 
cannot be paid off by a single entity. 
 
 
4.2. Liability for delivering air service provision: the designation of providers 
The fragmentation of liability regulation in the SES represents a fundamental hurdle to legal certainty 
in the development of an integrated European ATM75. For the first time, Eurocontrol pointed out this 
problem in 2005 with regard to the establishment of EU Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) and the 
supply of air navigation services, underlining the necessity to clarify the liabilities of states, service 
providers, organisations and individuals involved in the ATM regulatory framework76. 
Like in the EU regulations of other services of general interest, SES has introduced the 
separation at the functional level at least between service provision and supervision77, in order to 
enhance transparency and clarify the responsibilities of both service providers and the national 
supervisory authorities. 
As far as air traffic services (ATS) are concerned, the first relevant issue is that designation of 
air service providers is performed by National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) according to national 
and international law. This designation is an administrative measure by which a state (through its 
competent authority) entrusts a certified service provider with the right and obligation to provide air 
navigation services (ANS) within a specific portion of national airspace on an exclusive basis. A state, 
                                                     
72 See Recitals 98-99 and art. 23 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council No 2006/123/EC of 12 
December 2006, on services in the internal market. Note that this directive explicitly excludes its applicability to services 
in the field of transport: see recital 21 and art. 2 (2d). 
73 On insurability problems see D.R. Connolly, Insurance: The Liability Messenger, in J.R. Hunziker - T.O. Jones (eds.), 
Product Liability and Innovation. Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment, cit., p. 132 ff; P.W. Huber, Junk Science 
in the Courtroom: The Impact on Innovation, in J.R. Hunziker - T.O. Jones (eds.), ibidem, p. 148. 
74 This is the case of Germany, where the insurability of catastrophic risk is addressed by constructing an insurance pool 
which include reinsurers. In this regard, see G. Brüggemeier, Common Principles of Tort Law. A Pre-Statement of Law, 
cit., p. 271. 
75 This is the reason why clarification and harmonisation have been asked for in the revision and improvement of the SES 
package. See High Level Group for the future of European Aviation Regulatory Framework, European Aviation. A 
framework for driving performance improvement, July 2007, p. 20. 
76 Eurocontrol, Mandate on Support for Establishment of Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs), Final Report, May 2005, § 7.5. 
77 Art. 4 (2) of Reg. (EC) No 2004/549. 
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however, can appoint a foreign provider to perform these tasks, on the basis of bilateral interstate 
agreements. Therefore, either domestic law in case a national air service provider is designated or 
bilateral interstate agreements for cross-border service provision defines the legal framework for 
alleging liability78. In this latter event, a state (the delegating state) transfers the competence for 
performing ATS functions within a specific area of its airspace to another state (the provider state), 
establishing a relationship between states, and excluding any formal agreement between the delegating 
state and the designated service provider79. The primary liability can alternatively be charged on the 
state in whose territory the damage occurred and irrespective of the effective service provider 
(territorial state doctrine); on the state providing the ATS (provider state doctrine); on the effective 
foreign service provider charged before the delegating state, which retains however a subsidiary 
liability (effective service provider doctrine). 
Framing liability in the European airspace means applying cross border service provision in a 
new context, which is based on the operational performance of FABs rather than on national 
sovereignty. Therefore, the international model of ATS delegation as a state-to-state agreement is 
transposed in a different legal framework, which asks for operational coordination throughout the 
whole of European airspace. The enforcement of different liability models can affect the same 
performance of service provision among FABs. The Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission 
advised the EU Commission to address sovereignty and liability issues in order to meet difficulties in 
the implementation of FABs and the cross-border provision of air traffic services80. 
From this point of view, the experience of Eurocontrol in the establishment of the Maastricht 
Upper Air Traffic Control (MUAC) is very interesting; this is an integrated model of cross-border 
service provision within the upper air space for Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany that can be 
considered a first example of FAB, as it has been subjected to SES regulation since 2004. As far as the 
liability regime is concerned, Eurocontrol endorses the provider state doctrine in its Model 
Agreements on ATS delegation81 and it applies it to its own liability for damage arising from the 
MUAC activity82. 
This model has been also suggested to the EU, but the regulation on common requirements for 
air navigation services continued to apply the choice of the liability model to the agreements between 
the involved parties83. The absence of a common (top-down delivered) model in liability regulation 
demonstrates that the approach to ATM is still grounded on the international pattern, even though its 
management aims at being unified in a supranational legal framework. 
In particular, Reg. (EC) 1070/2009 devolves the supervision of air navigation service 
providers to the agreement between Member States, and the arrangement for the handling of cases 
involving non-compliance with the applicable common requirements on ANS and, in particular, on 
liability to cooperation among National Supervisory Authorities84. This regulatory model aims to 
promote a more flexible approach based on agreements between delegating states and air service 
                                                     
78 According to the art. 28 of the Chicago Convention, however, states must retain liability for air navigation service 
provision over their territory. It should be considered that since this Convention has been concluded among states it does 
not give private parties any right to claim compensation for damage related to ATM. 
79 Annex 11, sec. 2.11, of Chicago Convention. 
80 See Performance Review Commission, Evaluation of Functional Airspace Block (FAB) Initiatives and their contribution 
to Performance Improvement, October 2008, Recommendation 17. In particular, it suggests analysing legal impediments 
to the development of SES and to provide guidance on the appropriate legal framework for liability of states, National 
Supervisory Authorities and remove any restriction on the designation of service providers based in other Member States. 
81 Annex A, art. 5, Common Format Letter of Agreement Between Air Traffic Services Units, 2005. 
82 See art. 25, Eurocontrol International Convention relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Bruxelles, 
1960, as amended by the Multilateral Agreement relating to Route Charges, Bruxelles, 1981, and the Protocol 
consolidating the Eurocontrol Convention (the “Revised Convention”), 1997 (whose ratification is still ongoing). 
83 See Annex 1, § 7, of Reg. (EC) 2096/2005. 
84 Art. 2 (3) and (4) of Reg. (EC) 550/2004, as amended by Reg. (EC) 1070/2009. 
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providers, by designating a foreign service provider directly (without delegation)85, and through the 
mechanism of joint designation by the interested states of a single service provider, whereas a FAB 
extends over the territory of more than one Member State86. Moreover, sub-delegation of tasks by the 
interested air service providers can be applied87. 
This search for flexibility, however, does not establish new mechanisms to allocate liability. In 
the event of direct designation of a foreign service provider, liability is governed by the laws of the 
designating state who applies one of the mentioned international doctrines; in case of joint designation 
the liability regime depends on the location where damage occurred. If it happens in the sovereign 
airspace of a country, liability is still governed by national laws; but when a cross-border service 
provision dimension exists, the agreement should charge liability either on contracting states (so that 
every state is liable over its territory), or on the designated service provider itself (recognizing a 
subsidiary liability of concerned states), but it also has the possibility to establish a special regime 
substituting the common rules of the concerned national laws. 
Finally, in the case of sub-delegation, the sub-delegation contract should provide 
compensation clauses to ensure that the designated air service provider will be indemnified for all the 
cost reimbursed to the territorial state in respect of damages caused by the sub-contractor. This means 
that even though the SES outlines a common regulatory framework for ATM, the liability regime in 
ATS is governed by contractual decisions based on national rules. 
 
 
4.3. Open issues on liability for safety standard setting 
The pursuit of safety standards is based on the assumption that catastrophic risks can only be mitigated 
on a rational basis and the introduction of fixed thresholds of protection cannot therefore eliminate the 
possible occurrence of these risks. The rational management of catastrophic risks then requires that 
liability can be distributed among the relevant actors of this regulatory framework, so that the still 
possible damage and the actual burdens stemming from this lawful rule-making do not affect some 
parties in a disproportionate way. 
Liability for standard setting can be addressed either from a negligence standpoint or from a 
strict liability perspective. In the first case, public standard setters can be considered liable for faulty 
supervision if the due care standard is violated with regard to the management of foreseeable risks. 
Negligence therefore consists in the avoidable creation of foreseeable risks by missing the duty of care 
which is directly related to the mitigation of these risks. This is the case of Italy, where the state has 
been held liable for omitted vigilance on blood products and transfusions with regard to the 
transmission of infections on the basis of a causal link, only since the time when the infection risks 
were known to medical science88. 
When looking at the same issue from the perspective of strict liability, the need to compensate 
damage is related to the effects of specific conduct and not to the misbehaviour of the actor. This 
means that the focus is on the level of acceptability of a specific risk regardless of the unlawfulness of 
its effects. The aim of this particular kind of liability is to compensate the exceptional harm on 
individual parties and to restore an equal distribution of public burdens in the achievement of public 
goals. This conception can be framed in the remedy available in French law, the responsabilité sans 
                                                     
85 Art. 8 (2) of Reg. (EC) 550/2004, as amended by Reg. (EC) 1070/2009. In particular, it provides that national legal 
systems must not prevent the designation of air traffic service providers on the ground of national requirements, such as 
the ownership of the Member State or its nationals, its registration or operation in the territory of the concerned Member 
State, or the use of facilities only in that Member State. 
86 Art. 8 (5) of Reg. (EC) 550/2004, as amended by Reg. (EC) 1070/2009. 
87 Art. 10 of Reg. (EC) 550/2004. These agreements between service providers setting out their specific duties and functions 
should be notified to national supervisory authorities. 
88 Supreme Court of Cassazione, III, civ., 31 May 2005, n. 11609. But note that this decision has been challenged by the 
following case law of lower courts, on the basis of the necessity to compensate the damage to psycho-physical integrity, 
coming also from unforeseeable risks, since due care is related to the correct development of safety controls before the 
blood transfusion (regardless of the specific virus in question). See Tribunale di Roma, II, civ., 3 January 2007. 
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faute, which pursues the solidarity principle in the allocation of risks89. The public standard setter 
therefore provides compensation to those intolerable risks as the last resort to compensate victims. 
This model has also been applied in blood product cases, where blood transfusions infected patients, 
by introducing fair compensation. 
In the current ATM legal framework, liability for fault is basically blamed on states and the 
achievement of safety goals seems to rest upon the National Supervisory Authorities, who are engaged 
at different levels in their definition. On the one hand, these administrations have a constant regulatory 
dialogue with the European parties involved, both in the definition of the performance targets and 
indicators (EASA, Eurocontrol, and the EU Commission), and in the monitoring of the national/FAB 
plans (Eurocontrol and the EU Commission). On the other hand, these national authorities designate 
the certified air service providers who should provide air navigation services and they implement, in 
collaboration with the relevant stakeholders of the ATM, concrete plans aimed at mitigating safety 
risks. This central role of the national authorities makes the current liability framework under the SES 
fragmented, since it is grounded on a traditional state-based approach to aviation regulation in the 
absence of a strong top-down coordination at the supranational level. 
As far as extra-contractual liability is concerned, EU institutions90 as well as Eurocontrol91 are 
actually subjected to their relative liability for fault clause, which covers damage stemming from 
unlawful conduct. In the case law, however, there is no relevant case about the negligence in safety 
standard setting in the sector of ATM, since only medical practice offers examples in this regard. 
Furthermore, strict liability for standard setting cannot be included in the current liability framework. 
In particular, the EU legal order – unlike its Member States – does not provide general rules on strict 
liability, since liability for rule-making is considered a bond to the exercise of public power which is 
acceptable only when a rule conferring individual rights is infringed92. Strict liability therefore can be 
introduced in the EU legal framework only on a legislative basis, which assumes that a different 
distribution of burdens can help to respond to the public interest and namely the safety goal in ATM. 
In addition, the current legal framework does not address liability issues related to the 
implementation of safety through the interaction of human beings and technology in the performance 
of ATM tasks. ATM related accidents can be the result of human error, technological failure and 
defective interaction between these two systems93. The so-called socio-technical systems (which 
correct functioning is related to the correct interaction of human operators and technology) therefore 
                                                     
89 See J. Rivero, Droit administratif, Dalloz, Paris, 1975, p. 279; J. Moreau, La responsabilité administrative, PUF, Paris, 
1996, p. 99; A. Lazari, Modelli e paradigmi della responsabilità dello Stato, Giappichelli, Torino, 2005, pp. 149-151. 
Note that strict liability regime has been implemented also in Spain (see art. 139 (2) of Ley de Régimen Juridico de las 
Administracionés Públicas y del Procedimento Administrativo Común, of 26 November 1992) as a means of protection 
against public action, regardless of the qualification of the conduct and the damage (responsabilidad objectiva global), 
but its extent has been reduced progressively. See O. Mir Puigpelat, La responsabilidad patrimonial de la administración 
hacia un nuevo sistema, Civitas, Madrid, 2002. The roots of strict liability can also be found in German law, even if in 
this case the premise of compensation is not the solidarity principle, but the liberal claim to restore individual proprietary 
rights (intended not only as property rights, but also as rights to life and health, according to the German Constitutional 
Court’s case law. See BVerfG of 14 July 1981, Pflichtexemplar-Entscheidung, and of 15 July 1981, Naßauskiesung-
Beschluß) affected in their very heart: since the achievement of public goals imposes a special sacrifice on the proprietary 
rights of specific parties, compensation should be provided in order to keep on protecting these fundamental rights of 
individuals. See P. Badura, Fondamenti e sistema della responsabilità dello Stato e del risarcimento pubblico nella 
Repubblica federale di Germania, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 1988, pp. 400 and 404-406. 
90 Art. 340 (2) TFUE (ex art. 288 (2) TEC). According to EU case law, this clause is referred only to liability for unlawful 
conduct. See ECJ, C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur SA and Factortame, 2006, §§ 28-29; ECJ, C-120/06 P and 
C-121/06 P, FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies and Fedon&Figli s.p.a. v. Council and Commission, 2008, §§ 168-179. 
91 Art. 25 of Eurocontrol Convention (which bases liability on negligence). 
92 See ECJ, C-46/93 and C-48/93, cit., § 45; ECJ, C-352/98 P, Bergaderm SA e Goupil v. Commissione, 2000, §§ 41-42; ECJ, 
C-282/05 P, Holcim (Deutschland) AG v. Commission, 2007, § 47. 
93 Consider that ATM related accidents can arise directly from the functioning of the ATM system (direct contribution of 
ATM to the causal chain producing the damage) or they can contribute indirectly to the event, by increasing the severity 
of the damage (indirect contribution). Furthermore, incidents can be relevant for ATM system, even if this system does 
not contribute to their occurrence. See EASA, Annual Safety Review, 2010, pp. 48-49. 
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need special attention as complex structures the safe functioning of which cannot merely result from 
the correct functioning of its parts. Liability therefore should be distributed between human and 
automated operations, having regard to this procedural system as a whole94. 
Even if ATM operators are involved in the regulatory process with advisory tasks, the current 
legal framework, however, provides only some scattered liability rules in this regard and it does not 
address the problematic interaction between humans and software driven appliances. Basically, as far 
as human operators are concerned, the Chicago Convention charges the ultimate responsibility for the 
flight to the aircraft commander, even if the commander has to follow the instructions of the control 
tower95. 
Despite the enhanced automation of ATM systems, software liability is not specifically 
tackled and it remains subject to the liability rules of the related product or service. This means that if 
software is associated with a product, strict liability applies; on the contrary, when software works in 
the framework of a service, negligence applies the reference for liability. 
On the grounds of the European regulation concerning product liability96, the software 
industry ends up bearing the main risk of technological developments in ATM, since manufacturing 
producers are strictly liable for defective products. This regulation can be applied to both 
manufacturing defects and design defects, although it is much more difficult to prove a design defect 
for injured users since this regulation was introduced for the protection of consumer safety in the 
contracts of sale. 
If this regulation has been introduced to encourage the production of safe products97, its 
application in ATM has to be adjusted to standard-based safety regulation, operating in the potentially 
catastrophic environment. This means that those exemptions to liability provided in the product 
regulation should be applied in this specific regulatory area and therefore further guarantees should be 
introduced in order to provide effective remedies to safety failures. In particular, exemptions to 
liability should be harmonised in a consistent legal framework. For instance a balance should be struck 
between the possibility of exempting the producer from liability when the defect is due to the 
compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities98, and the 
possibility for states to maintain the liability of the producer for  risks unknown at the time of 
production99. Since the technologies used in aviation are not excluded from the application of this 
regulation, the burden of progress should be shared among relevant actors by clarifying the applicable 
rules in order to prevent the “collision” between the search for safety and the pursuit of technological 
innovation100. 
Legal uncertainty increases when software is considered as a service101: in this case, liability is 
related to service provision and service providers need to be covered with liability insurance, which 
should be appropriate to the nature and the extent of the risk. Currently, in the private sector the 
                                                     
94 From this point of view, the accident over Überlingen in 2002 is very significant; conflicting information between (human) 
controllers and automated systems led to the mid-air collision of two civil aircrafts. This accident has become a relevant 
case study on the functioning of socio-technical systems. See S. Bennett, The 1st July 2002 mid-air collision over 
Überlingen, Germany: a holistic analysis, in Risk Management, 1/2004, pp. 31-49; G. Contissa, Addressing Liability of 
Automated Systems in Air Traffic Management, cit., p. 5. 
95 See Annex II to Chicago Convention, setting the “rules of the air”. 
96 See Directive of the Council No 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985, as amended by Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council No 1999/34/EC of 10 May 1999, on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. 
97 See F.E. Zollers - A. McMullin - S.N. Hurd - P. Shears, No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an 
Industry That Has Come of Age, in Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J., 4/2005, pp. 768-773. 
98 Art. 7 (d) of Directive No 85/374/EEC. On the still uncertain effects of the “regulatory compliance defence” see G. 
Brüggemeier, Common Principles of Tort Law. A Pre-Statement of Law, cit., pp. 68-69. 
99 See art. 15 (1b) of Directive No 85/374/EEC. 
100 See B.A. Cosgrove, Innovation, Engineering Practice, and Product Liability in Commercial Aviation, in J.R. Hunziker - 
T.O. Jones (eds.), Product Liability and Innovation. Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment, cit., p. 114 ff. 
101 See G. Contissa, Addressing Liability of Automated Systems in Air Traffic Management, cit., p. 5. 
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possibility of insuring against risks is related to the nature of the risk at stake: only if risk is 
foreseeable and measurable (meaning that the amount that parties are willing to pay to transfer the risk 
of loss to an insurer exceeds the premium needed to cover the expected costs of providing coverage), 
can it be insured. This means that uncertainty about the risk makes it very difficult to forecast future 
losses when setting premiums and therefore to identify the advantage in risk bearing compared to the 
party that is exposed to loss. The potential catastrophic impact of software malfunctioning in ATM, 
therefore, seems to undermine this remedial system, since insurance runs into significant issues of 
effectiveness in the framework of catastrophe. In this case, insurance companies have no means to 
afford these risks on their own and this is the reason why insurance pools have been established in 
Germany in the fields of airlines, atomic power plants, and pharmaceuticals102. 
The absence of a coherent and clear legal framework addressing these liability issues in 
European ATM regulation can however become a real hurdle to the general implementation of 
sophisticated software that can potentially enhance the capacity and the efficiency of air traffic 
management. This means that technological innovation is not encouraged if no guarantee exists that 
possible losses can be distributed103. The only way new safe technologies can be effectively 
implemented is in a clear legal context about who is liable for what and in what conditions104. 
The reorganisation of ATM in Europe therefore asks for a proportional redistribution of the 
related liabilities, in order to make the whole legal framework cope with the efficiency goals. When 
deciding who is charged with what liability, the further knot to be undone is, what is the relationship 
between standardisation of protection and the charge of liability. Through a post-event intervention, it 
would be possible to compensate damage and to pursue ex post an equal distribution of risks and 
individual burdens. From this point of view, a fund financed by all the parties involved in the 
regulatory process would help cover the failures of safety standards. 
 
 
5. Final remarks 
In society today safety cannot be address as the absence of any danger, but it is instead to be 
considered as the reasonable control of unacceptable risks105. Safety therefore is the result of the 
rational risk management in the attempt to reduce the impact of adverse effects on the relevant 
community. This trade off between risk and safety is mediated by technology, since the progress of 
scientific knowledge can move the boundaries between these undetermined concepts and it therefore 
affects both the instruments and the content of risk management106. From a legal point of view, this 
triangular relationship between risk, technology and safety consists in the definition of precautionary 
measures and remedies aimed at implementing the safety goals. These legal solutions can be highly 
diversified according to the nature of the risks at stake and the state of the art of scientific knowledge 
in the specific field of interest. 
The ATM system represents a remarkable case study, since the primary goal of this activity is 
to assure aviation safety, and failures can have a catastrophic impact. In order to mitigate this trade off 
between risk and safety, automation has been implemented with the aim to support human activity in 
improving risk management. Addressing the legal issues of this specific regulatory area, this paper has 
focused on safety standards as precautionary measures aimed at the rational management of disaster 
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risks and on liability as a direct remedy to redistribute and compensate the catastrophic consequences 
of potential accidents. 
Safety and risk management in ATM assumes a particular importance since the European 
Union has demonstrated that it cares about it as a means to enhance the efficiency of air traffic 
throughout Europe and therefore to develop the competitiveness of air services and to achieve a 
further integration of the EU economy. 
By implementing the project of the Single European Sky, the EU has followed its strategic 
approach to catastrophic risk regulation and it has therefore boosted the search for aviation safety 
through the development of standards of protection. This rational approach to uncertain risk 
management has the clear advantage to prevent uncertainty becoming an obstacle to the progress of 
society, it is however based on the tacit assumption of reliability of risk-monitoring systems. 
Since scientific knowledge is fallible and it needs to be continuously updated, the substantial 
gaps in precautionary protection should be addressed from a legal point of view, by providing specific 
legal remedies against safety failure. Besides contingency plans, which tackle the uncertain reliability 
of technology by managing emergencies, further legal remedies should be provided, in order to 
compensate ex post the (possible) damage. 
The European regulatory framework is thus weak as it does not deliver a clear and 
homogeneous system of remedies and above all, it does not address liability issues in a direct way, but 
instead it relies on national regimes. The absence of common provisions on liability rules for collapse 
in the ATM system, however, has a significant impact on the same implementation of the Single 
European Sky, because the different actors involved in ATM do not have legal certainty about the 
consequences of their conduct and their interaction with automated systems. 
The fragmentation of liability rules lies in the traditional national approach to ATM, which is 
not brought into question by the EU. The integration process which is affecting air law in Europe, 
however, cannot ignore the necessity to harmonise national regimes on the one hand, and to introduce 
new liability rules addressing specific needs on the other. This means that the international approach to 
ATM that is based on agreements between states cannot last, since airspace is no longer going to be 
governed on a territorial basis (that is, national airspaces) and it is going to be managed with an 
operational approach (as FABs demonstrate). Even if Member States remain the main parties in ATM, 
new instruments to manage air traffic in a more coordinated and integrated way should be introduced 
in order to implement ATM efficiency in the long run. Furthermore, the standardisation of safety asks 
for remedies that can redistribute public burdens in case the standard setting fails when assessing the 
risk/safety trade off. This involves the introduction of strict liability rules in disaster risk regulation 
that are not consistent with the current framework of liability in EU. 
This fragmentation of the current legal framework in ATM reveals the legal difficulties in the 
integration of the European skies. This gap in legal protection depends on the distribution of 
competences in the EU between Member States and EU institutions; and ATM is an extraordinarily 
useful illustration from this point of view, in so far as air law has its roots in the same concept of 
national sovereignty. However, the pressing needs stemming from disaster risk regulation could 
become a key factor to pursue in the progress of EU integration. 
 

  
 
